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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
HUBER & ROWLAND CONSTRUCTION I 
CO. Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. I 
CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No. 
8766 
The Respondent disagrees with the Appellant's Statement 
of Facts for the reason that many of the facts set forth in Appel-
lant's Brief are not supported by the record. This case was 
tried to the Court below and from the evidence the Court 
rendered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and, there-
upon, entered its Judgment and Decree. The appeal which is 
before the Court has for its record only _the pleadings in the 
Court below, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
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Judgment and Decree in addition to one of the Exhibits intro-
duced into evidence at the trial designated as Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit No. 1, which is a written agreement by and between the 
Parties hereto. The only facts, therefore, before this Court 
are those as set forth in the Findings of Fact and as set forth 
in Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1. 
These facts are as follows: The Appellant entered into 
a written contract with the Respondent incorporating plans 
and specifications admitted into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 
1 and 2. Therein, Appellant agreed to construct curb and gutter 
and sidewalk for the Respondent, known as South Salt Lake 
Special Improvement District No. 5. In connection therewith, 
64,904 square feet of existing sidewalk was removed by the 
Appellant as required by the contract, and it was paid 75 cents 
per cubic yard for all sidewalk thus removed. The Court found 
there was no trade, practice or custom in the construction 
industry requiring a construction of the written contract em-
bodied in Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 which was different from or in 
modification of the written contract. The Court further found 
that the Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 set forth the bid price per unit 
of work to be done as shown in the proposal. 
From these Findings of Fact, the Court concluded that 
sidewalk removal was part of the excavation work covered by 
the Contract and that the Appellant had been properly paid 
therefor. As a result, judgment was entered in favor of the 
Respondent "no cause of action." 
There are also various sections of the specifications which 
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rrDefinition. General excavation shall include the 
performance of all operations necessary in the excav~­
tion of earth and rock of whatever kind from areal 
excavations, street sections; to excavate ditches, chan-
nels and borrow pits; to excavate for reservoirs and 
water basins, building foundations or basements, fill 
depressions and build embankments and dikes to the 
dimensions and at the locations shown on the plans 
or as directed by the Engineer; to construct the sub-
grade for all types of street pavements, including side-
walks, curb and gutter, driveways, etc., to excavate 
for and backfill around waterways and culverts, and 
all incidental work of whatever nature necessary to 
complete the work in accordance with the plans and 
these specifications." 
Other sections are as follows: 
2.4.1. rrDescription. Structural excavation shall in-
clude the performance of all operations incidental to 
the excavation of earth and rock, of whatever kind, 
for structures on this project. It shall include backfill 
and embankment of excavated material, the disposal 
of all material not required, or not suitable for backfill 
or embankment, and the cleanup and restoration of 
surfaces except as hereinafter specifically provided." 
2.4.2. rrclassification. All structural excavation shall 
be unclassified.'' 
1.4.4. rrExtra Work. New or unforeseen items of 
work found to be necessary, and which cannot be 
covered by any item or combination of items for which 
there is a contract price, shall be classed as 'Extra 
Work.' The Contractor shall do such extra work and 
furnish such materials as may be required to complete 
fully the whole work contemplated upon written order 
of the Engineer. In the absence of such written order 
no claim for 'Extra Work' shall be considered." 
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There are also two paragraphs of the Contract itself to 
which the Respondent invites the attention of the Court. They 
are as follows: 
"1. SCOPE OF WORK: The Contractor shall per-
form everything required to be performed, shall pro-
vide and furnish all labor, tools and equipment, and 
shall furnish and deliver all materials so specifically 
stated as being furnished by the Owner, to complete 
all the work necessary to construct Special Improve-
ment District No. 5 in the South Salt Lake City, Utah 
in the best and most workmanlike manner, and in 
strict conformity with the provisions of this Contract, 
the Instructions to Bidders, the Proposal and the Plans 
and Specifications. The Plans and Specifications, the 
Instructions to Bidders, and the Proposal are hereby 
made a part of this Agreement as fully and to the same 
effect as if the same had been set forth in the body 
of this Agreement.'' 
"8. CONTRACT PRICE: The Owner shall pay the 
Contractor, as full consideration for the performance 
of this Contract, the contract unit bid price per item, 
as shown in the Proposal, for the quantities of work 
actually performed." 
There are other provisions of the Contract which are only 
incidentally helpful as to the issue here involved, but Respond-
ent has called to the Court's attention those items which it 
feels bears directly upon these issues. 
ARGUMENT 
·The only error claimed by the Appellant to have been made 
by the Court below was as to its interpretation of the Contract. 
It is claimed that the Court below was required to construe 
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the Contract in favor of the Appellant as a matter of law. 
On page three of the Brief of the Appellant at the beginning 
of the last paragraph, the Appellant specifically states that it 
accepts the Findings of Fact of the trial court as being correct. 
Even though Appellant has no quarrel with the Findings of 
Fact, it contends that the Court below upon making such find-
ings was required, as a matter of law, to construe the Contract 
in its favor. 
On page two of Appellant's Brief, it contends that an item 
of sidewalk removal was omitted from the proposal either 
through inadvertence or mistake. There is nothing before the 
Court to support this contention. There is no Finding of Fact 
nor any other evidence from which the Court on appeal could 
consider the question of whether an item necessary to the 
Contract had been omitted by inadvertence or mistake. The 
whole argument of the Appellant assumes that the Contract 
is not complete because specific reference is not made therein 
to sidewalk removal. There is no evidence before this Court, 
however, that the Contract is incomplete or in any way defec-
tive because it did not make specific provision for sidewalk 
removal as a separate item. 
The Court had before it evidence from which it made one 
of its Findings of Fact which was specifically that there was 
no trade practice or custom in the construction industry re-
quiring a construction of the contract different from or in 
modification of the written contract. This was a vital issue in 
the trial of this cause in the court below. It was argued by 
the Appellant that the Contract was incomplete and did not 
cover the agreement of the parties. The Court carefully 
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analyzed all provisions of the "Contract, discovered that there 
was .a <:onsiderable amount of excavating to be done which 
was performed under the terms of the Contract and for which 
payment was made and received by the Appellant, all of 
which included the sidewalk removal as well as .all other 
matters excavated. From all the evidence, the trial court found 
that the written agreement covered the agreement of the 
parties with respect to sidewalk removal as well as all other 
matters and that the Appellant had bee.n properly paid therefor. 
Throughout Appellant's brief,. extensive argument is 
made to prove that sidewalk removal was a part· of the exca-
vation work included within the terms of the Contract. Further, 
the Appellant himself contends that removal of old sidewalk 
was necessary to establish proper grades for the new sidewalk. 
"It was, therefore, clear to the Appellant when it was preparing 
its bids and before the Contract was let that the sidewalk 
removal actually accomplished would be necessary in connee~ 
tion with the performance of the contract. From a reading of 
Section 2.4.2., it is clear that also· Appellant knew that the 
structural excavation was unclassified. It, in fact, removed 
the sidewalk and was, in fact, paid for the sidewalk which was 
removed. The Appellant does not claim otherwise, except to 
say that it was not paid a proper amount for the sidewalk 
which was removed. It claims that there must be extra com-
penSation for this particular kind of work. 
There is no evidence before this Court that there was to 
be any extra compensation made for the removal of sidewalk. 
But even assuming. that. siaewalk. removal constituted extra 
\VOrk to be performed under the Contract, then and in that 
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event, Section 1.4.4. is brought to bear upon this case. From 
a careful reading of this section as set forth in Respondent's 
brief, it will be seen that new or unforeseen items of work 
found to be necessary and which cannot be covered by any 
item or any combination of items for which there is a contract 
price shall be classed as extra work. The section then goes 
on to say that the contractors shall do the extra work and 
furnish such extra materials as may be required upon written 
order of the engineer. In the absence of such written order, 
no claim for extra work shall be considered. There is no evi-
dence before the Court in this case that sidewalk removal was 
extra work. But even assuming this to be so, there is no evidence 
before the Court that the engineer made any written order 
for such extra work. Under the specific provisions of the 
Contract, in the absence of such a written order, no claim for 
extra work is to be considered. These provisions of the Con-
tract were specifically before the Appellant. If during the 
course of the construction of this Contract, Appellant found 
itself disgruntled and desired to claim extra compensation for 
the work required to be performed under the terms of the 
Contract, it could certainly have made demand for additional 
compensation claiming this to be extra work. With the record 
entirely silent in this connection, under the terms of the written 
agreement, any claim for extra compensation has not been 
properly laid by the Appellant. 
A great deal of stress is laid by the Appellant upon 
Webster's definition of ··rock.'' The Respondent has no quarrel 
with such definitions, however, when we follow the rule urged 
upon the Court by the Appellant that a Contract is to be con-
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strued as a whole, it becomes abundantly dear that all structural~ 
excavation was unclassified and it included the performance. 
of all operations incidental to the excavation of earth and rock 
of whatever kind for the structures on this project. As another 
part of the section 2.2.1. it was to perform all incidental work 
of whatever nature necessary to complete the work in accord-
ance with the plans and specifications. Paragraph one of the 
Contract provides that the plans and specifications, the instruc-
tions to bidders and the proposal are hereby made a part of 
this agreement as fully and to the same effect as if the same 
had been set forth in at length in the body of this agreement 
When the Court reads all of these provisions as a whole, it 
became abundantly clear that the contractor was fully apprised 
of all excavation work necessary to complete the project and 
that it was entirely dear to him that there would be a certain 
amount of sidewalk removal incident to the accomplishment 
of this excavation. Under these circumstances it cannot be 
said that the Appellant was misled by the Respondent. In 
bidding the excavation work to be done, the Appellant was 
to submit a bid which would cover the excavation work shown 
to be done upon the plans and specifications. If he felt that 
sidewalk removal would be. more difficult than ordinary exca-
vation, he could certainly take that into consideration in con-
nection with submitting his bid. He was never invited to bid 
for earth removal only, or for rock removal only, or for any 
other item. He was simply invited to bid for the excavation 
. work which would necessarily have to be accomplished to 
put in the proposed improvements, and was advised that 
structural excavation ~was unclassified. 
10 
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We think the rules of construction involved in the instant 
case are too well settled for argument. They include the rule 
that the Contract must be construed as a whole. Also that all 
provisions of the Contract must be given effect. 
CONCLUSION 
It is hereby submitted that the Contract between the Plain-
tiff and Defendant covered all work required to be done by 
the Appellant, that the work was performed and payment was 
made to the appellant by the Respondent for all work com-
pleted, including sidewalk removal. The trial Court had before 
it all the evidence of the parties with respect to these matters 
and made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law con-
sistent with the evidence, and in as much as the Appellant has 
no quarrel with the Findings of Fact, the same are stipulated 
by the parties hereto as being correct. Certainly under the Find-
ings of Fact as made by the Court below it was entitled to 
render its Judgment in favor of the Defendant, no cause of 
action. Since the Judgment of the Court is fully supported by 
the record, the Court on Appeal ought not to disturb it. It is, 
therefore, respectfully submitted that the Judgment and Decree 
of the Court below should be affirmed by this Court with costs 
to the Respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOWRY, KIRTON & BETTILYON 
Wilford W. Kirton, Jr. 
Attorney for Respondent 
519 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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